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DE NOVO REVIEW UNDER THE FOOD STAMP
ACT: INTERPRETING "ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION"
I. Introduction
Congress passed the food stamp program in an effort to improve
the diet of low income Americans.' Its express purpose is to alleviate
hunger and malnutrition of the poor while strengthening the agri-
cultural economy.2 To insure easy participation, eligible households
can purchase food at local markets.3 The procedures for the certifi-
cation of eligible households and the issuance of food coupons is left
to the states,4 but the Secretary of Agriculture retains the power to
issue and enforce regulations.5 Pursuant to this authorization,6 the
Secretary has issued regulations concerning the items which may be
purchased with food stamps,' as well as the procedures for the dis-
1. Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703 (codified at 7 U.S.C. 2011-
25 (August 31, 1964)). In simplest terms, the Food Stamp Act allows low income families to
purchase food coupons which can be exchanged for food. Eligibility and the amount of
coupons which can be purchased are based on the income of the entire household.
2. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-12 (1964), as amended by Act of Jan. 11, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-671 §
1, 84 Stat. § 2048 (1971).
It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress, in order to promote the general
welfare, that the Nation's abundance of food should be utilized cooperatively by the
States, the Federal Government, local governmental units, and other agencies to safe-
guard the health and well-being of the Nation's population and raise levels of nutrition
among low-income households. The Congress hereby finds that the limited food pur-
chasing power of low-income households contributes to hunger and malnutrition
among members of such households. The Congress further finds that increased utiliza-
tion of food in establishing and maintaining adequate national levels of nutrition will
promote the distribution in a beneficial manner of our agricultural abundances and
will strengthen our agricultural economy, as well as result in more orderly marketing
and distribution of food. To alleviate such hunger and malnutrition, a food stamp
program is herein authorized which will permit low income households to purchase a
nutritionally adequate diet through normal channels of trade.
3. 7 C.F.R. § 272.2 (1977).
4. 7 U.S.C. § 2019(b) (1970).
5. 7 U.S.C. § 2013(c), §§ 2020-21 (1970).
6. Id.
7. 7 C.F.R. § 272.6 (s) (1977).
"Eligible food" means any food or food product for human consumption except alco-
holic beverages and tobacco and also includes seeds and plants for use in garden to
produce food for personal consumption of the eligible household. It shall also mean
meals prepared and delivered by an authorized nonprofit meal delivery service or
served by a communal dining facility for the elderly to elderly persons and their
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qualification of violators.' As a safeguard, the statute provides a
right of judicial review of these administrative actions This review
is a trial de novo in the appropriate federal district court.'"
II. Federal Cases Under The Food Stamp Act
The language of the Food Stamp Act provides that the appropri-
ate federal district court; "shall determine the validity of the ques-
tioned administrative action in issue."" In interpreting this lan-
spouses and to households eligible under 271.3 (a)(2) or (a)(3) of this subchapter; and
meals prepared and served by an authorized drug addiction and alcoholic treatment
and rehabilitation program to houses eligible under § 271.3 (a)(4).
8. 7 C.F.R. § 272.6 (1977).
9. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(c) provides in part:
(c) All or part of any claim of a retail food store or wholesale food concern is denied
under the provisions of section 12 of this Act ( § 2021 of this title), notice of such
administrative action shall be issued to the retail food store or wholesale food concern
involved. Such notice shall be delivered by certified mail or personal service, If such
store or concern is aggrieved by such action, it may, in accordance with regulations
promulgated under this chapter ( § 2011 and note § 2025 of this title), within ten days
of the date of delivery of such notice, file a written request for an opportunity to submit
information in support of its position to such person or persons as the regulations may
designate. If such a request is not made or if such store or concern fails to submit
information in support of its position after filing a request, the administrative determi-
nation shall be final. If such a request is made by such store or concern, such informa-
tion as may be submitted by the store or concern, as well as such other information
may be available, shall be reviewed by the person or persons designated, who shall,
subject to the right of judicial review hereinafter provided, make a determination
which shall be final and which shall take effect fifteen days after the date of the
* delivery or service of such final notice of determination. If the store or concern feels
aggrieved by such a final determination he may obtain judicial review thereof by filing
a complaint against the United States in the United States district court for the
district in which he resides or is engaged in business, or in any court of record of the
State having competent jurisdiction, within thirty days after the date of delivery or
service of the final notice of determination upon him, requesting the court to set aside
such determination. The copy of the summons and complaint required to be delivered
to the official whose order is being attacked shall be sent to the Secretary or such
person or persons as he may designate to receive service of process. The suit in the
United States district court or State court shall be a trial de novo by the court in which
the court shall determine the validity of the questioned administrative action in issue.
It the court determines that such administrative action is invalid it shall enter such
judgment or order as it determines is in accordance with the law and the evidence.
During the pendancy of such judicial review, or any appeal therefrom, the administra-
tive action under review shall be and remain in full force and effect, unless an applica.
tion to the court on not less than ten days' notice, and after hearing thereon and a
showing of irreparable injury, the court temporarily stays such administrative action
pending disposition of such trial or appeal.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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guage, the Circuit Courts of Appeal agree that district courts have
the power to review, de novo, whether there was a violation. They
disagree on whether the de novo review provision permits the dis-
trict court to pass on the appropriateness of the penalty imposed by
the Secretary. 3 The issue in dispute is whether the court may mo-
dify a penalty at its discretion or whether the penalty imposed must
be upheld in the absence of abuse of discretion by the Secretary."
This dispute turns on the interpretation of the phrase
"administrative action" found in the statute.15
Some courts interpret this language narrowly, restricting review
to the Secretary's initial determination of whether a violation oc-
curred." Other courts interpret the language broadly, indicating
that they also must decide whether the penalty imposed by the
Secretary was proper. 7
A. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits: The Restrictive Approach
The Courts of Appeal for the Sixth" and Seventh Circuits 9 inter-
12. For an overview of the problem see Kogan v. United States, 426 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D.
Miss. 1977). A grocer was caught selling non-eligible items. After repeated violations, the
retailer was disqualified from participation for a period of six months. This is the basic fact
pattern of all the cited cases. Generally, there were violations followed by warnings. Ulti-
mately, a penalty was imposed and the retailer appealed to the courts. More specifically see
Cross v. United States, 512 F.2d 1212 (4th Cir. 1975), Goodman v. United States, 518 F.2d
505 (5th Cir. 1975), Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300 (6th Cir), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
878, (1972), Save More of Gary Inc. v. United States, 442 F.2d 36 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 987, (1971).
13. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(c)(1970).
14. See generally Goodman v. United States, 518 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1975), and Save More
of Gary Inc. v. United States, 442 F.2d 36 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 987 (1971), for an
overview of the issue.
15. See, Goodman v. United States, 518 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1975).
16. See generally, Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
878 (1972) and Save More of Gary Inc. v. United States, 442 F.2d 36 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 987 (1971).
17. See generally Cross v. United States, 512 F.2d 1212 (4th Cir. 1975), and Goodman v.
United States, 518 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1975).
18. Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 (1972). In
this case, defendant Martin was disqualified for a period of six months for repeated violations.
Martin blamed employee turnover, but the court noted that Martin should have instructed
his new employees.
19. Save More of Gary Inc. v. United States, 442 F.2d 36 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
987 (1971). The defendant in this case was disqualified for a period of thirty days after it had
been determined that various violations had been committed. The district court granted the
government summary judgment on the basis of documents showing that the defendant under-
stood the rules and regulations contrary to the claim he presented. The defendant appealed.
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pret the scope of the de novo proceeding narrowly. For example, in
Nowicki v. United States,2" the Seventh Circuit limited de novo
review to a determination of whether a violation had occurred.' If
the reviewing court found there was a violation, the imposed penalty
would stand as long as it was within the guidelines set by the Secre-
tary for the enforcement of Food Stamp regulations.22 The Sixth
Circuit reached the same conclusion in Martin v. United States.23
The rationale for this interpretation is found in Butz v. Glover
Livestock Commission Co.24 In that case, the Secretary suspended
defendant's registration for thirty days for repeated violations of the
weighing policy of the Packers and Stockyards Act. The United
States Surpreme Court upheld the sanctity of an administrative
penalty unless the sanction was; "unwarranted in law or. . .with-
out justification in fact." 2 Although this decision did not deal with
de novo review, the Sixth2" and Seventh Circuits" accepted it as
indicating the strong preference given the Secretary's exercise of his
judgment in setting a penalty. Both the Sixth Circuit in Martin"
and the Seventh Circuit in Nowicki 2l concluded that the imposed
penalty should stand provided it did not exceed legal guidelines. 0
Several district courts, in other circuits, adhere to the viewpoint
expressed by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. 31 The United States
20. 536 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1976).
21. Id. at 1178.
22. Id.
Having found that the Secretary here made an allowable judgment in his choice of
remedy, that the sanction imposed bears a reasonable relationship to the goal the
legislation was intended to accomplish, and that the sanction was within the limits of
the applicable statute was valid, we are compelled to reverse that part of the judgment
of the district court which reduced the sanction from one year to 120 days as an
impermissible intrusion into the administrative domain under the circumstances pres-
ent here.
Id.
23. 459 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 (1972).
24. 411 U.S. 182 (1973).
25. Id. at 185-86, quoting American Power and Light Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90, 112-13
(1946).
26. 459 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1972).
27. 536 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1976).
28. 459 F.2d 300.
29. 536 F.2d 1171.
30. 536 F.2d at 1178.
31. Berger v. United States, 407 F. Supp. 312 (D.R.I. 1976), Marcus v. United States
Dept. of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Serv. 364 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Pa. 1973), Eckstut v.
(Vol. VI
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District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Marcus
v. United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition
Service,32 summarized the conclusions expressed in other district
courts. Relying on Butz33 and Martin,34 the court stated that, "even
if we believed that the sanction was excessive and unjustified, which
we do not, we would be constrained to still uphold the sanction
imposed . . . ."I The district courts accept the original penalty
provided it is within the authorized limits.
B. The Fifth Circuit: The Broad Approach
In Goodman v. United States,35 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the Sixth Circuit's interpretation unduly
limited judicial review.37 It stated that the judiciary and the Secre-
tary of Agriculture are equal in their power to review the facts and
set an appropriate penalty.38 Noting that the authority of the Secre-
tary included both a finding of a violation and the imposition of a
penalty, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the term "administrative
action" required the court to review de novo whether there was a
violation as well as whether the penalty imposed was justified.30 The
decision of the Fifth Circuit is based on an interpretation of the
statute and on the broad definition of trial de novo in United States
v. First City National Bank.40 The Goodman court stated that Con-
gressional intent can be determined by examining the statute," and
took particular notice of the interrelation of the administrative pro-
cedure and judicial review.42 The court stated;
Hardin, 363 F. Supp. 701 E.D. Pa. 1973), Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. United States,
342 F. Supp. 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), Marbro Foods Inc. v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 754 (N.D.
Ill. 1968).
32. 364 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
33. 411 U.S. 182 (1972).
34. 459 F.2d 300.
35. 364 F. Supp. at 375.
36. 518 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1975).
37. Goodman v. United States, 518 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1975). In this case, Goodman was
disqualified for six months for violating the food stamp regulations on three occasions.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 509.
40. 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967). The Supreme Court stated; "the court should make an
independent determination of the issues."
41. Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703 (codified at 7 U.S.C. 2011-
25 (August 31, 1964).
42. 518 F.2d at 509.
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By following the proper linguistic antecedents within the statute, one can see
that the "questioned administrative action" refers to the "determination" by
the agency review body, which in turn is a determination of the propriety of
the section 2020 disqualification. As previously noted, the section 2020 dis-
qualification included two components: first, the determination that a store
has violated the law or the regulations; and second, a determination of a
period during which the store will be disqualified. Both components are
subject to the administrative review procedure. There is no indication in the
Act that the courts were not to have co-extensive review power."43
Essentially, the court concluded that Congress would have writ-
ten the statute differently had it intended the de novo proceeding
to be limited to a review of the alleged violation." The Goodman
court stated; "[a] plain reading of [the statute] leads us to con-
clude that Congress granted the district courts full review of the
agency's action when conducting a ' de novo' proceeding, including
review of the imposed sanction."4
C. The Fourth Circuit: A Modified Approach
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit initially aligned itself
with the restrictive approach of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.4" In
Welch v. United States," the majority opinion concluded that ad-
ministrative sanctions could not be revised once a violation had
been proven or admitted." The concurring opinion,"9 while agreeing
with the result, favored the broad approach advocated by the
majority in Goodman5l and the dissent in Martin.5 It favored
complete review of administrative actions. In an attempt to resolve
the conflict, the Fourth Circuit sat en banc to decide Cross v. United
43. Id.
44. Id. at 508.
45. Id.
46. Welch v. United States, 464 F.2d at 685 (4th Cir. 1972).
47. Id. at 682.
48. Id. at 684.
49. Id. at 685.
50. 518 F.2d 505.
51. 459 F.2d at 302 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
52. 464 F.2d at 685-86 (Butzner, J., concurring).
In sum, from the language of the Act and its legislative history, it appears unlikely
that Congress authorized the Department to disqualify a merchant for any period not
exceeding its own predetermined maximum without any hearing on the duration of the
disqualification.
Id. at 686.
[Vol. VI
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States,5" which resulted in four opinions covering the entire contro-
versy.54
The dissenting opinion" adhered to the view expressed in Welch"
that de novo review does not extend to the imposed penalty." For
similar reasons, Judge Donald Russell, concurring with the dissent,
aligned himself with this narrow interpretation.5
The opinion concurring with the majority followed the prevailing
view of the Fifth Circuit, concluding that the language of the Act
empowered the court to review all forms of administrative action:5"
the violation and the penalty. Relying on the dissent in Stark v.
Wickard,5 the concurring opinion accepted the broad definition of
trial de novo implied in the dissenting opinion of Justice Felix
Frankfurter:
The procedural provisions in more than a score of those regulatory measures
prove that the manner in which Congress has distributed responsibility for
the enforcement of its laws between courts and administrative agencies runs
a gamut all the way from authorizing a judicial trial de novo of a claim
53. 512 F.2d 1212, 1214 (4th Cir. 1975).
54. 512 F.2d 1212. The final vote was four for the majority, one concurring with the
majority, one dissent, and one concurring with the dissent. The opinions were written by:
Harrison L. Winter (majority opinion at 1214), H. Emory Widener concurring opinion at
1219), John A. Field (dissenting opinion at 1221), and Donald Russell (concurring with the
dissent at 1221).
55. 512 F.2d at 1221.
56. 464 F.2d 682.
57. 512 F.2d at 1221.
I adhere to the views expressed in my opinion in Welch and would note that the
majority decision places this circuit at odds with every other federal court that has had
occasion to consider this question.
Id.
58. Id. at 1226.
Contrary to the view of the majority, I think it abundantly clear that the sanction
imposed in this case met fully and completely the Butz test and that the District Court
was correct in dismissing the proceeding to review.
Id.
59. Id. at 1219.
Since the 'administrative action' must consist both of the finding of a violation and
punishment of disqualification, I think the statute as it allows a review of the 'validity
of the administrative action' and provides that if the administrative action is invalid
the court shall enter such judgment as 'it determines' in accordance with the law and
the evidence, may only be construed as granting a full right of review.
Id.
60. 321 U.S. 288,312 (1944).
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determined by the administrative agency to denying judicial review and
making administrative action definitive."
This language was construed as indicating the broad powers of a
court in a de novo proceeding. 2
These three opinions followed the differing views expressed in
other circuit courts. However, the majority in Cross63 did not accept
this reasoning. The majority proceeded to examine the nature of the
penalty" and concluded that to deprive a storeowner of participa-
tion in the food stamp program was a deprivation of property."
Therefore, due process requirements demanded that the Act include
a hearing before imposing a final sanction. Noting that the de novo
proceeding was the only authorized judicial review, 7 the court con-
cluded that the de novo proceeding must review all facets of the
administrative process, the violation and the penalty, to satisfy due
process requirements.68 The majority in the Fourth Circuit thus
shifted the debate from statutory construction" to constitutional
protections.'"
The Cross majority did not grant the district court complete dis-
cretion when reviewing the imposed penalty.7 It limited the review
to a consideration of whether the Secretary of Agriculture abused
his discretion. 2 Like the Seventh Circuit,73 it relied on the rationale
of Butz v. Glover Livestock Commission Co.74 which restricted judi-
61. 512 F.2d at 1220-21, citing Stark v. Wickard 321 U.S. at 312-13 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
62. 512 F.2d at 1220.
63. 512 F.2d 1212.
64. Id. at 1216-17.
The constitutional guarantee of due process of law applies to both: and we think it
applies here, because in a very real sense plaintiff will be deprived of 'property' if he
is disqualified from participation in the program for any period of time. Thus, we
readily conclude that he may not be deprived of partipation in the program, on the
basis of alleged wrongdoing, without being afforded procedural due process.
Id. at 1217.
65. Id. at 1217.
66. Id. at 1216.
67. Id. at 1216-17.
68. Id. at 1217-18.
69. Id. at 1219.
70. Id. at 1218.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Nowicki v. United States 536 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1976).
74. 411 U.S. 182.
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cial modification of an administrative penalty to situations where
the penalty was unwarranted and without justification.75 Unlike the
Seventh Circuit, the Cross court would not restrict review of the
penalty to whether it fell within legal guidelines set by the Secre-
tary."6 This approach gives the court greater discretion since it could
modify a penalty, which was within legal guidelines, if it found that
the sanctibn was excessive." The Fourth Circuit held that a sanction
would be reasonable if, as a whole, the Secretary did not abuse his
discretion.7
The Fourth Circuit concluded that this limited review would af-
ford the retailer an adequate hearing, thereby satisfying due process
requirements. 9 The retailer is protected from an unwarranted depri-
vation of property by having the court restrain the Secretary's dis-
cretion through comprehensive review of all administrative ac-
tions.10
III. Conclusion
The intent of Congress concerning judicial review of the adminis-
trative proceeding under the Food Stamp Act is unclear. The legis-
lative history provides little clarification of the issue."1 The House 2
and Senate"' debates focused on the proposed cost and benefits of
the program. 4 The remarks of the late Senator Hubert Humphrey
may provide some useful insight into Congress' intention when he
said that, "due process principles will be observed" in providing for
judicial review. Apparently, Congress was anxious to avoid com-
75. Id.
76. 512 F.2d 1212.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1218.
80. 512 F.2d 1212.
81. H. R. Rep. No. 1228 and S. Rep. No. 1124, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 reprinted in 1964
U. S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3275.
82. 110 CONG. REC. 7124 (1964).
83. 110 CONG. REC. 15429 (1964).
84. 110 CONG. REC. 15442 (1964).
Senator Humphrey spoke of three benefits to be derived: the community benefits by
increased purchases within the community, the farmer benefits due to the greater
demand for his product, and the participating families benefit by an improved diet.
85. Id. Senator Humphrey stated:
The language of the bill, for example, makes it abundantly clear that participating
grocers will not be arbitrarily suspended or disqualified for alleged violations; that 'due
1978]
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plex constitutional litigation concerning this program and therefore
authorized the de novo proceeding to review the violation and the
penalty to avoid such problems.
As Justice Brandeis stated in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority,11 a complex constitutional question should be avoided if
another means of settling the dispute is available. Careful consider-
ation indicates that the language of the statute is sufficient to deter-
mine the extent of judicial review authorized by Congress. The lan-
guage of the statute refers to judicial review of "administrative ac-
tion." Unless Congress specifies to the contrary, the term "action"
should refer to a review both of the violation and the imposition of
an appropriate penalty.
To accept the rationale of the Sixth 7 and Seventh Circuits,"8 that
review is limited to the finding of a violation, is to invite the due
process problems discussed by the Fourth Circuit majority in Cross
v. United States.9 By accepting the interpretation of the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Goodman,'" due process problems are eliminated and the
probable intent of Congress is met. Review by both the Secretary
of Agriculture and the courts of both the violation and the penalty
is the best method of insuring the rights of the retailer and the
public are protected and justice is done in each case.
Thomas S. Tesoro
process' principles will be observed, and that grocers will have access to both State
and U.S. district courts if they want judicial review of the Department's administrative
action.
86. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
87. Martin v. United States 459 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.), cert denied 409 U.S. 878 (1972).
88. Save More of Gary Inc. v. United States, 442 F.2d 36 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
987 (1971).
89. 512 F.2d 1212.
90. 518 F.2d 505.
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